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Abstract  
 The paper aims to analyze the simultaneous candidatures used in 
municipal elections in the province of Chaco in 1995, as responses to 
changes in electoral systems. The analysis is centered on the candidates who 
ran concurrently to two positions – mayor and councilor - at the same level 
of government in the same election; Discriminating winners from losers. 
It can be stated that the term quinieleras candidacies, resulted in a strategy 
that, out of a total of forty candidates, served to win to the head (mayor) 
three candidates of the Provincial party Acción Chaqueña; And in the prizes 
was effective for 11 candidates, of which nine correspond to Acción 
Chaqueña and two to the Radical Civic Union, political party of national 
order. 
The conclusions that the work leaves could be used for the analysis of the 
internal rules of the political parties, and to propose norms that really 
regulate the operation of the political parties. 
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Introduction 
 The selection and nomination of candidates to the different 
democratically elected public offices that are appointed via a voting system 
is a process that has not been studied in depth at subnational level in 
Argentina. 
 We present the analysis of the results of the nomination of candidates 
for mayors and council members in the political parties of the Chaco 
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Province and the results of the 1995 elections. This election was the first to 
take place after the 1994 constitutional reform. 
 In said reform the lengths of the mandates and the process to occupy 
municipal positions were affected by establishing the direct election of 
mayors and extending the mandate to four years. The previous regime 
provided for indirect election and a two- year term in office. 
 This study focuses on explaining a mechanism called voto quiniela 
(literally, quinella voting), both in the selection of candidates and in the 
electoral results. By voto quiniela, we understand the mechanism by which a 
candidate runs for two offices with different hierarchy in the same list 
simultaneously, in analogy with the popular game of chance organized by the 
Argentine National Lottery. This institution understands the lottery as a 
game with a great popular acceptance, which was formalized in 1973. It is a 
game with a pool type financing. It consists of making a draw of numbers 
ranging from 0000 to 9999, with a daily frequency from Monday through 
Saturday, and which has different modalities, depending on the alternative 
times of the day in which the drawing is performed (Morning, Afternoon, 
and Night). The game is popularly known as quiniela, and it allows for 
placing bets on both the actual number that is drawn and the order the 
numbers are drawn in.  Generally, bets are placed on a particular number to 
come in first (straight bet, biggest prize) or within any of the first top ten 
positions (smaller prize). 
 
Candidate selection logic  
 Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) mention three characteristics in 
electoral laws that influence the level of partisan discipline in different 
countries. These are the gathering of votes among the candidates of a party, 
control over who are to be party candidates, and control over the order in 
which candidates are elected out of the party lists.  
 Siabelis (2008) shows that research responds to three questions, 
focused on what the procedures are, what are the effects of those procedures, 
and what are the determinants of certain procedures.  
 With respect to the first question, Siabelis (2008) emphasizes that it is 
a private process in many countries that takes place within the party, and 
bases his statement on the classic work of Duverger (1959) arguing that it is 
secret because parties do not like to show how they carry out the process. 
Rahat and Hazan (2001) mention the complexity of the process and point out 
the presence of two difficulties that must be overcome by candidates: First, 
the different selectors in different places, and second, the multiple stages 
involved in these processes.  
 Regarding the types of procedures, Siabelis (2008) highlights that the 
investigations refer to three aspects related to this variable. The first aspect is 
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related to the degree of legal regulation or private control of the parties 
involved in the process (Ranney, 1981; Ware, 1996). The second aspect 
refers to the candidacy requirements, that is, regulations or laws imposed by 
the parties on potential candidates (Hazan, 2002; Rahat and Hazan, 2001). 
Third, the degree of centralization or decentralization of the process that may 
be territorial or functional (Czudnowsky, 1975, Hazan 2002, Norris 1996, 
Rahat and Hazan 2001, Ranney 1981, Ware 1996). 
 As for the second question, it mentions investigations that analyze the 
selection of candidates as an independent variable and tries to identify their 
effects. Most researches make it clear how candidate selections reflect and 
affect the distribution of power within parties (Gallagher et al., 2001, Henig, 
1970). With regard to this question raised by Siabelis (2008), the classic 
work of Michels (1949) is quoted, who argued that the selection of cases 
illustrates the oligarchical tendencies of the parties, thus becoming a means 
by which party leaders could prevent the emergence of new leaders (iron law 
of the oligarchies).  
 Analyzing the effects of the selection procedures, already in the 
middle of the 20th century Schattschneider had presented a metaphor that fits 
and is very illustrative of the process, expressing that the nature of the 
nomination procedure determines the nature of the party; the one who can 
make the nominations is the one who runs the show. This is therefore one of 
the best points in which to observe the distribution of power within the party 
(1942: 64). 
 As for the third question, Siabelis (2002) argues that there are few 
productions that try to account for the determinants of selection procedures, 
so it is difficult to establish solid conclusions that explain the factors 
involved in these processes.  
 According to Jones, Saiegh, Spiller and Tommasi (2000) in 
Argentina, since the return to democracy in 1983, the PJ (Justicialist Party) 
and the UCR (Radical Party) employed three different modalities in 
candidate selection: The elite arrangements, the assembly elections, and 
direct primaries. The first mechanism includes a variety of types of 
arrangements within a range from imposing a list by a provincial leader to a 
list that arose from negotiations among the provincial elites of the party. The 
second mechanism refers to lists that were the product of a formal provincial 
party assembly in which the delegates choose the candidates. The third 
mechanism only includes those cases where two or more lists compete in 
direct elections. 
 De Luca, Jones and Tula (2000) show that local partisan leaders are 
key in the nomination process, arguing that the decision to carry out interns 
in the PJ and UCR depends first on whether the party controls the 
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government at a provincial level, and secondly, whether the incumbent 
governor is in a position to seek reelection or not. 
 
Scenario and Political Parties in the Chaco Province 1983-1995.  
 Orsolini (2012) describes the evolution of the provincial political 
system from March 1983, with the end of proscriptions, to political parties. 
Characterizing it as bipartisan, with the predominance of the Justicialist 
Party over the Radical Party until in 1987 Acción Chaqueña emerges and 
gains access to seats in the provincial legislature. 
 This tripartite scenario in the provincial political system is used by 
Acción Chaqueña, an emerging and consolidating party that gets to the 
province's governorship in the 1991 elections. As the Chaco Province 
legislature, unicameral, is renewed every two years, Acción Chaqueña 
became a second force with twelve legislators out of a total of thirty in the 
1993 elections. The positions of members of the constitutional convention 
for the reform of the provincial constitution to be developed in 1994 were 
also included in the 1993 elections, within the framework of a wave of 
constitutional reforms that took place in the country at national and 
subnational levels, aimed at consolidating democracy.  
 Micozzi (2001), accounts that the Justicialist Party had the largest 
number of conventional members, however the sum of the conventional 
members from Acción Chaqueña and the Radical Party was greater. This 
situation stopped Justicialism from imposing indefinite reelection to the 
governor and vice-governor, and generated a consensus in the new modality 
of election of mayors and mandate terms. 
 
Material (human or other) and methods 
 For the study, the sixty-eight municipalities of the province of Chaco 
were analyzed, taking into account the category system stated in the 
Provincial Constitution that groups them in three, according to the number of 
inhabitants. The sources used were the official candidates’ proclamation 
proceedings by political of mayors and councilors parties that run for 
elections in all categories of municipalities and the elected candidates 
proclamation official proceedings for those elections in the Province of 
Chaco in 199584.  
 From these proceedings, simultaneous candidacies for mayors and 
municipal councilors were identified and tabulated and were grouped by 
parties from the four variations presented: Mayor and 1° council member, 
mayor and 2° council member, mayor and 3° council member, and mayor 
and 5° council member. Then, a second table was drawn up showing the total 
                                                          
84Extracted from the Chaco Province Electoral Tribunal website www.electoral.chaco.gov.ar  
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number of candidates without discriminating between parties, resulting in the 
number of winners and losers to the positions of mayor.  
 The previous steps enabled the development of a bar graph showing 
the number of simultaneous candidacies by parties in their different 
variations, and tables that provided the winning and losing candidates, both 
for the position of mayor and for the position of council member. These 
tables made it possible to differentiate the effectiveness of the strategy in the 
different positions in which it was used and to determine which one had 
greater prevalence. 
 
Objectives:  
 As of the new form of election of the municipal executive positions, 
this work aims to analyze how these modifications affected the selection of 
candidates for these positions in the municipal elections of 1995, with special 
emphasis in the voto quiniela as the mechanism used by some Parties in that 
election. 
 
Results / conclusions 
 One of the effects of changing how mayors are elected has been the 
appearance of simultaneous candidacies to the positions of mayors and 
council members in first, second and third order. Seven of the eleven parties 
that presented candidates for the elections used this mechanism. 
 The following graph shows the prevalence of Action Chaqueña in the 
use of this mechanism.  
Graph 1 
 
Source: Compiled by authors based on the data presented on the Chaco Province Electoral 
Tribunal website www.electoral.chaco.gob.ar 
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 These data raises the following question: who or how many won the 
elections and took the mayor office? Forty nominations were identified, in 
which winners and losers were distinguished in the categories of mayors 
(table 1) and council members (table 2). 
 
Table 1: Number of winners and losers for mayor in municipal elections in the province of 
Chaco with simultaneous nominations in 1995 
Total of Simultaneous Applications  40 
Winners 3 
Losers 37 
Source: Compiled by authors based on the data presented on the Chaco Province Electoral 
Tribunal website www.electoral.chaco.gob.ar 
 
Table 2: Number of winners and losers for council member in municipal elections in the 
province of Chaco with simultaneous nominations in 1995 
Total of Simultaneous Applications  40 
Winners 11 
Losers 29 
Source: Compiled by authors based on the data presented on the Chaco Province Electoral 
Tribunal website www.electoral.chaco.gob.ar 
 
 This way it is observed that this strategy of "betting" (in the 
metaphorical sense of the word) distributing the risk is only completely 
effective in three out of forty cases. With regards to obtaining council 
member seats, it was found that the effectiveness of the strategy was greater.  
 Moving forward with the density of the description on the strategy 
results, it is necessary to emphasize that: 
• For the mayor category, the candidates who won the elections using 
this strategy were part of Acción Chaqueña. The elected candidates 
proclamation proceedings confirm this as it is stated there: “Given that 
he/she has been previously proclaimed mayor, and having also been elected 
as first place council member, the list of the Acción Chaqueña Party must be 
shifted in the mentioned category”85. The electoral laws at that time left the 
selection of the candidates to the internal and private decisions to the parties, 
an issue that was resolved by the PASO (Spanish acronym that stands for 
Simultaneous and Mandatory Open Primaries) that somehow rushed the end 
of the quiniela candidacies. 
• In municipal council member category, the winners largely belong to 
Acción Chaqueña and, in a smaller proportion (two people out of a total of 
eleven), to the Radical Party. In this sense, certain aspects were identified, 
related with the voting volume of the election and the territorial scope of the 
                                                          
85 Act 435/95 corresponding to the 1995 elected candidates proclamation proceedings. 
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parties in the municipalities in which the candidates become council 
members. As far as the candidacy's requirements imposed by the parties are 
concerned, the logic described by Hazan (2002) and Rahat and Hazan (2001) 
is valid. This type of candidacies clearly show that the requirements imposed 
by the parties in the context studied were to have real possibilities of 
securing some of the positions to which the candidate was presented. 
Concerning the UCR in particular, a correlation with the statements by 
Jones, Saiegh, Spiller and Tommasi (2000) was found, given that in some 
municipal districts in the Province, elite arrangements predominated over 
assembly elections and direct primaries. From a more analytical perspective, 
it can be stated that a list arrangement prevailed, in which a very strong local 
leader appeared in places of the list that ensured their access to the position. 
• From a demographic point of view, the municipalities in which the 
strategy worked for one party or another, are not the big cities. The 
municipalities in which the simultaneous candidacies according to the 
provincial constitution 86 are successful are within the second or third 
category. As the research related to the degree of centralization or 
decentralization of the process, which can be territorial or functional, studied 
by Czudnowsky (1975) and Norris (1996) among others, the option of the 
voto quiniela gives clear signs that the candidates’ selection process was 
highly decentralized in the territorial aspect. As a result, the power for 
nominating candidates ends up falling into the hands of the local leaders, 
who finally nominate the candidacies for the municipal elections at will; a 
phenomenon that is strongly emphasized in the smaller urban centers. 
• The strategy was used by seven parties in thirty-two municipalities of 
the province.  
• The national parties with little territorial reach in the province used 
the strategy in the first category municipalities, while the far-reaching parties 
used the strategy in small towns that coincide with third-category 
municipalities. 
• The Justicialist Party did not use the strategy; the Radical Party used 
it in 10% of the total municipalities of the province.  
 In the province of Chaco, the selection of candidates for municipal 
executive positions in the 1995 election was mainly handled by the parties 
themselves and, when selecting candidates for municipal executive positions, 
the party oligarchies iron law studied by Michels (1949) was enforced. 
 This electoral trick is a strategy used by parties with low voting 
volume, in small districts. For this reason, logic dictates that, the greater the 
                                                          
86 The 1994 constitution of Chaco province establishes in section 183, three municipality 
categories that vary according to the amount of population of the district. 
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size of the district and the greater the voting volume of the party, the fewer 
possibilities of using this mechanism. 
 This mechanism made it possible for a provincial party to access 
municipal legislative positions in municipalities where the voting volume 
prevented it from being a competitive force.  
 As for the national parties, the strategy was associated with their 
running in districts where the elite party structure and its voting volume 
prevented them from competing in municipal elections.  
 On the other hand, the mechanism was more effective in small 
municipalities, which responds to two factors. Firstly, the party component, 
as this strategy was used by Acción Chaqueña and the Radical Party in third 
category municipalities mostly. Secondly, the electoral competitiveness of 
each municipal electoral system. Since not all parties have lists of candidates 
for local offices in all municipalities, the competition is reduced and, as the 
candidacy is simultaneous, it increases the chances of accessing at least one 
of the offices. 
 It should be researched in the future whether these strategies were 
used again in subsequent elections, as well as whether they were used in 
other provinces of Argentina. 
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